The Fault Mode Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA), describe the impact of identified faults. They form an important category of knowledge gathered during the design phase of a satellite, and are used also for diagnosis activities. This paper proposes their extension, allowing a finer representation of the available knowledge, at approximately the same cost, through the introduction of an appropriate representation of uncertainty and incompleteness based on Zadeh's possibility theory and fuzzy sets. The main benefit of the approach is to provide a qualitative treatment of uncertainty where we can for instance distinguish manifestations which are more or less certainly present (or absent) and manifestations which are more or less possibly present (or absent) when a given fault is present. In a second step, the proposed approach is extended to handle fault impacts expressed as event chronologies. Efficient, real-time compatible discrimination techniques exploiting uncertain observations are introduced, and an example of satellite fault diagnosis illustrates the method. A brief rationale for the choice of possibility theory and fuzzy sets is provided. Besides, the proposed approach is related to the logical view of diagnosis.
I. Introduction
Fault diagnosis is a problem that has been addressed by various kinds of techniques, depending on the type of failure to be detected or isolated, and on the available knowledge. Some approaches are purely numerical, exploiting a continuous model of the system; they are based on automatic control methods such as analytical redundancy (Patton et al. [1] , or pattern recognition methods (e.g., Dubuisson [2] ). These approaches are mainly concerned with fault detection. In total contrast, some diagnosis methods oriented towards fault isolation focus on a logical model of the system and perform abductive inference or consistency analysis (e.g., De Kleer and Williams [3] , Poole [4] , Struss and Dressler [5] , Console-Torasso [6] ). In a similar spirit, yet another class of approaches exploits causal information between failures and their symptoms; the causal knowledge is then represented as a Bayesian network (e.g., Pearl [7] ), or more simply in terms of causal matrices (Reggia et al. [8] [9] ). This paper is concerned by the latter type of methods, which are usually simple and require less costly information, having thus more appeal at the operational level.
Matra Marconi Space (MMS) has been investigating and experimenting spacecraft diagnostic support systems for about ten years. A diagnostic technology called DIAMS, initiated in 1985, led to the development of a prototype expert system dedicated to the Telecom 1 Attitude and Orbit Control System [10] , DIAMS-I, and to the present Telecom 2 Expert System [11] , DIAMS-II, covering a whole satellite (platform and interfaces with the payload), which was installed in the Satellite Control Center at the beginning of 1993 [12] .
Achieving the development of large scale systems allowed MMS to validate the approach chosen and the appropriateness of the underlying concepts. However, in the representation of the knowledge, its comprehensiveness and the efficiency of the system was priviledged against the fineness of the knowledge represented. Simplified representations well suited to the practical problems faced in space industry were introduced as a first approximation. A progressive refinement of the models and of the reasoning paradigms (for instance to include the handling of uncertainty and time) is now being considered in the definition of a new generation of knowledge based systems, DIAMS-III [13] , [14] . This paper presents a causal relational method for diagnosis in the framework of FMECA, whose expressive power is improved with respect to the crude relational setting offered by Peng and Reggia's parsimonious covering theory [8] [9] . This is achieved by means of a qualitative uncertainty calculus in the causal matrices, based on Zadeh's possibility measures [15] and their dual measures of certainty (or necessity). The approach does not presuppose the ability to quantify conditional probabilities nor does it assume that prior probabilities of fault modes are available. Yet the uncertainty calculus improves the discrimination power of the causal approach.
Section II offers a brief summary of the MMS approach to fault diagnosis and emphasizes the importance of the "Fault Modes Effect and Criticality Analyses" (FMECA), while Section III explains the rationale for the introduction of uncertainty handling and for the choice of possibility theory, on the basis of user's needs. In Section IV, we focus on the extension of FMECA allowing the expression of uncertainty in the expected effects, and on their use in the diagnostic process along with uncertain observations. We then propose additional tools to exploit them better in real-world applications. Section V relates this solution, based on uncertain causal matrices, to a logical view of diagnosis. On this basis, a new extension, allowing the exploitation of consequences of faults expressed as event chronologies, is given in Section VI. Section VII illustrates the techniques proposed through a realistic example taken from the application domain. This paper is an extended and revised version of a conference paper [14] .
II. Space Diagnostic Support Systems-DIAMS

II.1. Operational Context
In orbit, satellites (for short S/C) communicate with their Control Centers via the telemetry flow (S/C to ground), and by telecommanding (ground to S/C). Part of the telemetry is dedicated to the monitoring of the S/C, which provides a partial description of its current state. Once an anomaly has been detected by the Control Center real-time monitoring services, and possibly after an emergency procedure has been executed to put the satellite in a safe configuration, it is necessary to locate the origin of the anomaly as quickly as possible, i.e., finding the switchable elements that will allow to recover nominal operation in order to better ensure the safe continuation of the mission.
The diagnostic support systems are used for near-real-time fault isolation, and for the training of the Control Center staff who has to face a continuous increase of the complexity of the monitoring and control tasks.
The DIAMS diagnosis system faces the same constraints as most knowledge based systems designed to be embedded in operational environments. The most stringent are:
• for the knowledge base: knowledge accessibility: the system must rely on knowledge that can be made available at a low cost; knowledge validability and upgradability: for a 10 to 15 year lifecycle.
• for the process: reliability of answers, explanation capabilities and reasonable computation time, enabling user's acceptance and an increased reliance on the diagnostic system (what we call "delegation" in the following).
II.2. DIAMS Architecture
DIAMS is based on a set of complementary representations of the satellite and of the knowledge about its behaviour, such as:
• heuristic and strategic knowledge for solving the most common problems, and to focus the diagnostic process, e.g., based on decision trees.
• behavioral knowledge, generally describing how the satellite would respond to a given fault. It includes so-called FMECA (described in the next section), models of the evolution of parameters as functions of time, etc.
• functional knowledge, composed of hierarchical functional decompositions of the system, with identification of commands, observables, etc.; a propagation function is associated to each functional element (assumed to be nominal), describing how an anomalous input would affect its output.
The knowledge base is broken down into so-called Knowledge Islands (K.I.), corresponding to manageable pieces of the different domains of expertise. Each KI is responsible for the exploration of one hypothesis, possibly generating new refined hypotheses. This segmentation is very important, as it allows to make the reasoning process tractable within each individual KI. It requires however a powerful focusing mechanism, so as to limit the number of KI explored.
A diagnostic session starts when the user inputs a set of anomalies. Initial investigation procedures, presently mostly based on decision trees, are used to restrict the exploration of the models to relevant local areas, such as a behavioural or functional KI. An overview of the diagnostic process is given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . Some behavioural KI are composed of a reduced set of FMECA related to a family of symptoms, that allows the exploration and refinement of some higher level hypothesis (See the example, Section VII). 
Initial
II.3. FMECA: From Design to Operations
The general principle of Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) is to analyze the behaviour of the system parts in presence of failures of its various components. FMECA's are a standard industrial approach for managing the reliability of critical systems during their design stages. The aim is to check that there do no exist unique fault modes that would put the whole satellite out of order. Exploiting FMECA's for off-line diagnosis is not a trivial task and requires a significant amount of processing. Note that the FMECA approach is often required by customers, and FMECA's are part of the documents that testify the reliability of the satellite at a contractual level. As a consequence, the FMECA outputs are exploited at various states of the satellite lifecycle by different types of users:
• designers, to capture the system behaviour in dysfunctioning situations, to assess the fault tolerance concepts implemented by the system, and to elaborate the "Telemetry Plan" specifying the nature and location of the measurement points on the S/C so as to optimize the system observability and diagnosability.
• product assurance (PA) personnel, to validate the design with respect to fault tolerance requirements,
• Assembly, Integration and Test (AIT) personnel, to help in constructing test plans and diagnosing anomalies,
• operation engineers, as a basis for the elaboration of fault trees and contingency recovery procedures. Fault trees represent an important part of the knowledge used for operational diagnosis. FMECA may also provide additional information on the criticality of the fault, or in some cases, the corrective action itself. This information may also be exploited to optimize the diagnostic strategy so that the most critical or most probable faults are isolated first.
• FMECA do not provide exhaustive lists of effects for full sets of failure modes. A complete impact analysis, down to the smallest details is generally too expensive (and often plain impossible). The central objective of FMECA is design verification. At each level (equipment, function, sub-system, system), failure modes and effects are filtered by the PA personnel and only the most significant modes (in terms of likelihood of occurrence), and effects (in terms of impact at higher levels) are considered. This filtering, discarding a significant part of the knowledge gathered during design or AIT, is generally grounded on the experience and personal judgement of the PA engineer.
III. Handling Uncertainty and Incompleteness
III.1. Expressing the Needs
III.1.1. More Delegation Through More Reliability
The goal of the on-going refinement of DIAMS technology is to improve the reliability of the diagnoses, in order to reach a better integration of the system in the operational environment, especially through a better acceptance of the diagnosis support system by the user.
As far as reliability is concerned, receiving no answer from the diagnosis system, or receiving a large set of hypotheses which still remain at the end of the diagnostic process, is always better than obtaining an erroneous solution. All possible solutions detected by the system should be provided; then, they should preferably be sorted according to some plausibility measure, or by criticity, etc.
Three main selection criteria were used to select knowledge representation paradigms and reasoning techniques:
• cost of knowledge acquisition;
• answer quality and reliability: closeness to the real solution for a given knowledge acquisition cost, and ability to evaluate the amount and nature of the evidence leading to the proposed solution. We are for instance interested in distinguishing reasons for rejecting some faults from evidence suggesting other faults.
• efficiency of the diagnostic techniques, allowing a good reactivity of the system.
III.1.2. Incompleteness and Uncertainty of the Observations
After an anomaly occurs, the real-time monitoring gives an initial set of symptoms, which is incomplete in three ways:
• observability of satellites, although excellent, is limited (e.g., less than 2000 telemetry points in Telecom2);
• a finer analysis of the past telemetry flow, performed off-line, allows most often the discovery of numerous additional symptoms;
• as the satellite dynamics are not instantaneous, some effects of the fault may not have occurred yet when the diagnostic session is started.
Therefore, the diagnostic system should not assume the absence of symptoms that have not been observed yet, unless this absence is confirmed by the user.
A finer analysis of the telemetry flow is often a difficult task involving high-level interpretation by the Control Center engineer. As a result, one may not be completely certain of the presence or absence of the symptom prompted by the system. The use of a scale with a few qualitative uncertainty levels (e.g., "certain", "almost certain", likely", "unknown"), allows the user to provide a more realistic expression of his / her information, and thus provides more reliable information to the diagnostic support system.
III.1.3. Incompleteness and Uncertainty in the Knowledge
The models of the satellite and of its behaviour are intrinsically incomplete, all the more so as the knowledge acquisition cost is a critical issue. The reliability of the answers given by the system demands that no assumptions be made about what is not expressed explicitly, i.e., that partial ignorance be handled adequately.
In the behavioural knowledge, for instance, expressing some expected consequences of a given fault does not mean that any other manifestation is impossible. However, the experts can often express that some consequences are more likely than others, and this kind of information, when available, should be exploited by the system. This information about likelihood is generally qualitative rather than quantitative. Also, we may have "negative information" stating that some manifestations cannot appear or are almost impossible as the consequences of an hypothesized fault. In the functional knowledge, a major aspect of incompleteness handling is that the DIAMS modelling technique does not require all fault modes to be made explicit. In a similar way as in the behavioural knowledge, the propagation functions of the functional units should be able to accept incompleteness and uncertainty.
Overall, in order to capture uncertainty in the knowledge, a qualitative approach sounds more adapted to the available information than a quantitative one. Moreover, it seems useful, due to incompleteness of the knowledge, to distinguish between symptoms that are more or less surely observed from those whose presence is only possible.
In the following, we give a brief overview of possibility theory which is the approach we are going to use for modelling uncertainty in a qualitative way.
III.2. Overview of the Basic Notions of Possibility Theory
The basic idea of possibility theory, introduced by Zadeh [15] is to use fuzzy sets no longer to just represent the gradual aspect of vague concepts such as "large", but also to represent incomplete knowledge, tainted with imprecision and uncertainty. In such a situation the fuzzy set "large" represents the only information available on some parameter value. In this theory, uncertainty is described using dual possibility and necessity measures defined as follows [16] .
A possibility measure ∏ defined on a finite propositional language and valued on [0,1] (or more generally on a totally ordered scale) satisfies the following axioms:
where ⊥ and T denote respectively the ever-false proposition (contradiction) and the ever-true proposition (tautology). Axiom (ii) means that p ∨ q is possible as soon as one of p or q is, including the case when both are so. ∏(p) = 1 means that p is unsurprizing but not that p is sure since ∏(p) = 1 is compatible with ∏(¬p) = 1 as well. On the contrary ∏(p) = 0 implies ∏(¬p) = 1. It should be emphasised that only ∏(p ∧ q) ≤ min(∏(p),∏(q)) holds in the general case, since we may know that p ∧ q is rather impossible (e.g., if q = ¬p, p ∧ q is ⊥, which is impossible) while p as well as q may remain somewhat possible when we are in a state of incomplete information. More generally, ∏(p ∧ q) is not a function of ∏(p) and ∏(q) only. This completely departs from fully truth functional multiple-valued calculi often referred to as "fuzzy logic" (e.g., Lee [17] ), where the truth of vague propositions is a matter of degree, these degrees being fully compositional with respect to all logical connectives.
A necessity measure is associated by duality with a possibility measure by:
It means that p is all the more certain as ¬p is impossible. Axiom (ii) is then equivalent to:
This means that for being certain about p ∧ q, we should be both certain of p and certain of q, and that the level of certainty of p ∧ q is the smallest level of the ones attached to p and to q. Note that we have N(p) > 0 ⇔ ∏(¬p) < 1 ⇒ ∏(p) = 1 since max(∏(p),∏(¬p)) = ∏(p ∨ ¬p) = ∏(T) = 1. By duality with respect to ∏, we only have N(p ∨ q) ≥ max(N(p), N(q)). Indeed, we may be somewhat certain of the imprecise statement p ∨ q without being at all certain that p is true or that q is true.
The following conventions are adopted in possibility theory (see Figure 3 , where the possible values of the pair (N,∏) are represented). • N(p) = 1 means that, given the available knowledge, p is certainly true; conversely, if p is declared to be true we consider it as certain.
• 1 > N(p) > 0 means that p is somewhat certain and ¬p not certain at all (since the axioms imply that ∀p, min(N(p),N(¬p)) = 0. N(p) > 0 represents a tentative acceptance of p, to a degree N(p); the last equality means that one cannot accept both p and ¬p.
• ∏(p) = ∏(¬p) = 1 (equivalent to N(p) = N(¬p) = 0) corresponds to the case of total ignorance; it expresses that, from the available knowledge, nothing enables us to say if p is rather true or rather false.
• 0 < ∏(p) < 1 (equivalent to 1 > N(¬p) > 0 means that p is somewhat impossible, i.e., that ¬p is somewhat certain and p not certain at all. Again, it represents the acceptance of ¬p.
• ∏(p) = 0 means that p is certainly false.
A possibility measure ∏ is generally associated with a possibility distribution π. This possibility distribution, also valued on [0,1], is defined on the (finite) set of interpretations Ω of the propositional language (for instance, if the language contains only the two propositions p, q, there are four interpretations: p true and q true, p false and q true…). This possibility distribution is supposed to encode the fuzzy set of the more or less plausible interpretations which agree with the available knowledge. A possibility measure is defined from π as follows:
where [p] is the set of interpretations which make p true, i.e., the models of p. Thus, starting with a plausibility ordering encoded by π on the possible interpretations, i.e., the plausible states of the world, two functions ∏ and N are defined which enable us to assess the uncertainty pervading any statement p. The possibility distribution π is a representation of the available knowledge. Ignorance is represented by a uniform possibility distribution equal to 1 everywhere. Conversely, given a family of constraints N(p i ) ≥ α i > 0 for i = 1,n expressing our level of certainty for a collection of statements, we can compute the largest possibility distribution, i.e., the least restrictive one which agrees with these constraints; see Section V.
It should be noted that the probabilistic framework does not allow for the distinction between the possibility that p is true (∏(p) = 1) and the certainty that p is true (N(p) = 1), nor between the certainty that p is false (N(¬p) = 1 ⇔ ∏(p) = 0) and the absence of certainty that p is true (N(p) = 0 ⇔ ∏(¬p) = 1). Possibility theory thus contrasts with probability theory in which P(¬p) = 1 -P(p), and therefore P(¬p) = 1 ⇔ P(p) = 0, while here N(p) = 0 does not entail N(¬p) = 1. In our context, this distinction between possibility and certainty is crucial for distinguishing between sure effects and contingent ones. The incomplete states of knowledge captured by possibility theory cannot be modeled by a single, well-defined probability distribution. They rather correspond to what probabilists call "higher order uncertainty" whereby they mean "ill-known probabilities". This type of uncertainty is modelled either by second-order probabilities or by interval-valued probabilities. This kind of approach is usually complex, and possibility theory offers a very simple substitute to these higher-order uncertainty theories.
Possibility theory offers a common framework for the modeling of uncertainty and imprecision in reasoning systems. The use of max and min operations, along with the complement to 1, is in agreement with the requirement of computational simplicity and with the rather rough and qualitative nature of the uncertainty that can be expressed in many real world applications. It should be noted that in possibility theory, the modelling of uncertainty may remain qualitative. Indeed, we could use a finite completely ordered chain of levels of certainty ranging between 0 and 1, i.e., λ 1 = 0 < λ 2 <… < λ n = 1 instead of the whole interval [0,1], with min(λ i ,λ k ) = λ i and max(λ i ,λ k ) = λ k if i ≤ k, and 1 -λ i = λ n+1-i .
III.3. Rationale for the Choice of Possibility Theory
III.3.1. Knowledge Availability and Acquisition Cost
The complexity of the systems involved in a spacecraft and of their interactions make it impossible to gather meaningul statistical data that could allow the use of objective probabilities. Even subjective probabilities, imposing a complete ordering of the possible disorders in the prior knowledge, are ruled out by operational experts. For instance, they cannot compare the prior plausibilities of faults involving different equipments, or different domains (thermal, electrical, mechanical, etc.). We can expect at best a partial prior ordering of the faults identified. In addition, the number of the faults that are represented in the diagnostic support system is extremely small compared to all the possible faults, and the current knowledge base is therefore very incomplete.
III.3.2. Role of the Diagnostic System -Expected Results
The intended purpose of the diagnostic support system is not just to propose the "best" solution among a set of identified disorders, in all cases. As a support tool for the understanding of the problem, its first role is to select the disorders that are not incompatible with the observations (ranking them by decreasing compatibility), and then to rank the best candidates according to their direct relevance to the symptoms. Furthermore, the possibility of getting justififications for this ranking should be provided.
III.3.3. Compatibility with a Qualitative Expression of Uncertainty
The uncertainty exploited by the system is supposed to be expressed in qualitative terms by experts, who of course expect the results to be qualified with the same qualitative scale(s). This requirement causes problems in a probabilistic framework. The only well-understood framework for qualitative probabilities is the one of comparative probabilities (Fishburn [18] ), but its use is far from easy at the practical level because its representational requirements are exponential. Besides, it is often debatable to process qualitative uncertainty as if it were numerical, as many number crunching methods do: acting on numerical representations of qualitative data yields results that depend on the way the numerical encoding was made. Admissible, order preserving operations (which are not sensitive to numerical encoding) include, min, max, the median, etc, but neither addition nor multiplication (Fodor and Roubens [19] ).
IV. Diagnosis with Uncertain FMECA
IV.1. Representation of Incomplete, Uncertain FMECA
Incompleteness is inherent to FMECA. Our goal is to propose a flexible representation of the effects of fault modes that facilitates the expression of knowledge, down to the relevant level of detail. A detailed description of our process of introducting of uncertainty in a causal model was first given in [20] ; see [21] for a full exposition. We only describe here the main results of the most refined model (involving gradual uncertainty), and introduce its application to the extension of FMECA. Figure 5 . This is in accordance with the fact that for a non-fuzzy proposition p, we have N(p) > 0 ⇔ ∏(¬p) < 1 ⇒ ∏(p) = 1 since one of p or ¬p, at least, should be completely possible. A pair of fuzzy sets (F,G) such that F ∩ äG = Ø (which entails F ⊆ G) is called a twofold fuzzy set [23] . Twofold fuzzy sets (F,G) have been introduced for modelling incompletely known sets, i.e., sets whose characteristic function is ill-known. F represents the elements which more or less certainly belong to this ill-known set and G represents the elements which more or less possibly belong to it. But F ∪ äG might not cover the whole referential.
Here, the set of pairs The single fault assumption is made in DIAMS, as it is valid within the scope of use of the system. However, if we want to relax it, we should limit the search space by defining a set of subsets of disorders A ⊆ 2 D that may be simutaneously present, and define respectively the 
Otherwise, the subsets M(D) + , M(D) -have to be defined explicitly. Details about the extension to multiple faults of the model proposed can be found in [21] . The independence between disorders is a very common assumption in probabilistic causal diagnosis methods [9] . The above equations underly a cautious assumption, viewing µ M({d i ,d j }) + (m) as a lower bound on certainty, not presupposing a reinforcement effect on manifestations common to several causes. However this issue is a matter of further investigations in the possibilistic setting and is beyond the scope of this paper, where the single fault assumption is made.
IV.2. Diagnostic Techniques
In the part of the diagnostic process we focus on in this paper, the goal is to find plausible explanations for the symptoms observed (present and absent manifestations), using the extended FMECAs and the information available about the symptoms. The proposed solutions must be as reliable and as informative as possible given the available knowledge and observations. These conflicting requirements led to the joint use of consistency-based and abductive diagnostic approaches, their respective results being sorted and presented to the user with proper explanations. The system thus provides ordered sets of:
• Disorders that are (more or less) consistent with the symptoms observed. They are called potential disorders. As pointed out by (Console and Torasso [6] ), these are the only "fully safe" solutions when the knowledge is incomplete;
• The disorders that are (more or less) relevant to the symptoms: disorders for which some predicted effects are indeed observed. Limitation due to incompleteness: any disorder whose predicted manifestations (surely present ones) have not been tested yet will be discarded. Hence the importance of maintaining potential disorders;
• The disorders that (more or less) cover the symptoms: disorders that explain, i.e., predict, all the observed symptoms. Limitation due to incompleteness: a disorder will be discarded if it fails to explain one of the observed manifestations;
• The disorders which cover observed symptoms and for which all predicted effects are indeed observed. Limitation due to incompleteness: a disorder will be discarded if some of its predicted effects have not been observed yet.
Techniques for the derivation of these various solutions to the diagnostic problem are described in subsequent sections 2.2 and 2.3.
IV.2.1. Incomplete and Uncertain Symptoms
The symptoms are incomplete: many observables are not fully monitored in real time. Expressing uncertainty about the interpretation of the observable was also recognized as a need by domain experts that perform the fault diagnosis task. Indeed, some observations involve complex combination and abstraction of elementary pieces of data, followed by a high level interpretation of the result. Adequate formalisms are needed to handle incompleteness and allow expression of uncertainty about the presence/absence of a manifestation. From a discrimination point of view, introducing graduality in the characterisation of the observables (and in the uncertainty of the fault effects) enables the system to compute a ranking of the solutions.
A manifestation m is determined as being present or absent (maybe with some uncertainty, see III.1.2.) by the computation and qualification of the corresponding observable. M + and M -are fuzzy sets of manifestations which are respectively (more or less certainly) present, and (more or less certainly) absent. 
IV.2.2. Consistency-Based Diagnosis 1
Given the sets M + and M -at one step of the diagnostic process, the problem is to find the set of single disorders êD that are consistent with these symptoms, i.e., all the disorders that do not contradict the observations. In the crisp case (i.e., non-fuzzy), a single disorder is consistent with the symptoms if none of its surely expected consequences is absent, and none of its impossible consequences is present:
is a possible explanation: the observations are consistent with its predicted present and absent manifestations The extension of (1) to fuzzy sets of disorders can be done using the max-min consistency of two fuzzy sets. The consistency of two fuzzy sets F and G evaluates to what extent their intersection is not empty, i.e., the degree to which F ∩ G ≠ Ø, [15] . It is defined by:
The degree to which
. êD can thus be defined by: 
represent the degree of conflict between the new observation and disorder d.The revision of êD comes down to computing
As more observations are carried out the fuzzy set êD gets smaller and smaller.
In a real world context, it is very important for an operations support knowledge based system to be able to justify its results. This explanation capability is a key factor for the acceptance of the system by the users. In the proposed framework, the possibility degree µ ê D (d) of a disorder d can be justified by the list of the symptoms observed that are inconsistent with the disorder, rank-ordered by their conflict degrees (4). It is then possible to define for each d a fuzzy set J(d) of manifestations justifying the rejection of d:
This extension of the FMECA allowing an expression of uncertainty can also be used during the design stages of the satellite, to evaluate its observability, i.e., in particular to evaluate to what extent the fault modes identified for the equipments can be easily discriminated when the satellite is in operation. In our framework, the discriminability of two fault modes d i and d j is maximum when a sure effect of one is an impossible effect of the other. This can be straighforwardly extended to the fuzzy sets previously defined, using the consistency operator defined in (2) . The discriminability of a set of disorders D can be defined by:
IV.2.3. Abductive Diagnosis
The set êD of possible causes of the symptoms observed contains all the disorders that are (more or less) consistent with the symptoms. It should be noted that irrelevant disorders, i.e., disorders which cannot be related to the available observations (e.g., a disorder whose consequences are completely unknown) remain perfect candidates for our consistency-based approach. It is therefore interesting to compute subsets of êD containing disorders that are directly relevant to the current observations. A disorder is relevant if some of its (more or less) certain consequences are indeed present or if some of its (more or less) impossible consequences are indeed absent (the second part of this definition is sometimes not used in practice).
In the crisp case, the subset of relevant disorders is then ( Figure 9 ):
This set only contains the disorders that are not ruled out by the symptoms, but that are not suggested by them either. See Figure 9 . This can be easily extended to the fuzzy case using the fuzzy consistency index. Namely, A disorder d is completely relevant as soon as one of its sure consequences is certainly observed present (or as soon as one of its impossible consequences is certainly observed absent, if appropriate). In the case of multiple faults, the relevant disorders can be used as "building blocks" for constructing multiple-fault explanations.
It is possible to refine the set êD* further, for instance into the set êD** of the disorders whose sure effects cover the observations. It is then demanded that the certain effects of d cover the present manifestations, and (if appropriate) that the impossible effects cover the absent manifestations ( Figure 10 ):
It can be checked that êD** crisp ⊆ êD* crisp . It can be extended to the fuzzy case by: It should be noted that êD** is non-empty only when a rather complete knowledge of the effects of a given disorder is available. It should also be recalled that as the information given to the system is incomplete, only êD is completely "safe", i.e., is guaranteed to contain the fault. Sets such as êD* and êD** should be used as additional focusing tools that help sorting the potential disorders. A comparison with Peng and Reggia's approach [8] , [9] can be found in [20] . The main difference between the two approaches lies in the type of causal information that they capture. Our approach is more general because Peng and Reggia use only one type of causal information that corresponds to our M(d) -, and only positive observations, namely M + . Moreover, they use a probabilistic treatment of uncertainty. However our setting is more restricted than Peng and Reggia's because only single faults are searched for in our application. In the satellite application, the single fault assumption makes sense. Indeed a satellite is a very reliable system in which the simultaneous occurrence of multiple faults is very unlikely. The diagnosis system is supposed to handle the routine part of the diagnosis, that is, unique faults. When multiple faults occur, the diagnosis problem is taken care of by experts. It would be too expensive to search for multiple faults at the level of the industrial application because the problem is combinatorilly difficult (NP-hard, as proved by Peng and Reggia [9] ). And the benefit of allowing for extra-computation time is not worth the attempt, because multiple faults are very seldom.
Remark:
The present approach can be extended to the handling of faults whose effects appear sequentially in time. Let us consider a disorder d which takes place at time t, then our knowledge about its effects can be described by M + (d, t + k) and M -(d, t + k) for k = 0,n. Let us suppose that we have a sequence of observations represented by M + (t 0 + i) and M -(t 0 + i), i = 0,m. By convention M + (t 0 -i) = Ø = M -(t 0 -i), ∀ i > 0. Then, we can define the set êD t of disorders which may have begun at time t and which do not contradict the observations, in the crisp case, as êD t = {d ∈ D, ∀ k = 0,n, M + (d, t + k) ∩ M -(t + k) = Ø and M -(d, t + k) ∩ M + (t + k) = Ø}. The set of disorders which may be responsible for the fault(s), is given by êD = {d, ∃t, d ∈ êD t }. This can be readily extended to the fuzzy case. Similar extensions can be done for êD* and êD** and their fuzzy versions.
IV.3. Focusing the Diagnostic Process
As the diagnostic process is iterative, it is useful to have advice with respect to the selection of the next observables to be tested. Various strategies can be chosen, for instance to minimise the overal cost of the diagnostic session, or to discriminate the most critical disorders first, etc. For this purpose, we suggest measures of the utility of testing a given manifestation, in order to maximize the test impact on the evolution of the solutions.
From , (7) and (4), we can define the (negative) impact of the test of manifestation m on the possibility of the disorder d, assuming we know the result of the test:
taking into account (4): the impact is the difference of the degree of conflict of d with m and the degree of conflict of d with the previous observations, if this difference is greater than 0. It should be noted that this is still compatible with a purely ordinal representation of uncertainty: in this case, the subtraction operation used in (12) would correspond to the computation of the number of qualitative levels separating the present and future inconsistency levels. As we can see, the impact of the test of m on the plausibility of d is all the greater as d was considered as highly plausible and the result of the test is inconsistent with the presence of d.
As we obviously cannot know the result of the test beforehand, we evaluate its impact for its two extreme outcomes (manifestation being certainly present or certainly absent) on the possibility of the disorders. It is possible to define the set of tests relevant for a given disorder d. This set contains manifestations not observed yet that are among predicted effects of d (whether predicted as present or absent)
This definition is inspired from McIlraith and Reiter [25] and can be adapted to the possibilistic approach as follows:
A test is relevant with respect to a set D of potential disorders if all disorders in D can be confirmed or discarded by testing m, that is m ∈ Á d∈D T(d).
The corresponding relevance degree for testing m can be
A less drastic criterion for relevance of testing m could be m ∈ ª d∈äD T(d) (at least one disorder in äD can be discarded by m) yielding
Applying these definitions to the fuzzy set of potential disorders êD computed previously, one obtains the following test relevance indices r * (m) = min d∈D max(1 -
The with
These measures of the utility of the test of a given manifestation could of course be refined to take into account the cost of the test (in order to try to minimize the overall cost of the diagnostic session), or the criticity of the disorders (to discriminate the most critical first). Also, prior knowledge about the disorder plausibilities could be used as an additional ranking criteria to further differentiate among candidate solutions, or to discriminate the most likely disorders first. In the following the single fault assumption is made.
V. Link with the Logical
In possibilistic logic (see III.2. and [26] ), classical logic formulas are weighted by lower bounds of the necessity degree with which the formula is held for certainly true. Uncertainty in the FMECA can then be expressed using possibilistic logic in terms of a necessity measure N for all formulas in the theories T and M , for instance, N(¬d i ∨ m j ) ≥ α ij (corresponding to µ M(d i ) + (m j ) ≥ α ij ). Using the generalized modus ponens of possibilistic logic, it is easy to check [26] 
the presence of the manifestation m j is all the more certain as the disorder d i is certainly present and that m j is a certain consequence of d i . This can be applied for all disorders, leading to the following lower bound for the necessity of m j :
To match the full relational model previously described, where it is possible that M -≠ Ø and M(d) -≠ Ø, we add negative information N(¬d i ∨ ¬m j ) ≥ λ ij (corresponding to µ M(d i ) -(m j ) ≥ λ ij )) and N(¬m j ) ≥ ρ j (corresponding to M -). Then using modus ponens of 
V.2. Consistent Explanations
Consistent explanations are the disorders d which are not ruled out by the positive or negative observations (M + and M -). They are such that T, M + , M -% ¬d, i.e., such that {T, M + , M -, d} is consistent. This corresponds to the disorders which are in êD in the relational approach. Applying the extended inference rule (19) to N(¬d i ∨ m j ) ≥ α ij , N(¬m j ) ≥ ρ j , N(¬d i ∨ ¬m j ) ≥ λ ij , N(m j ) ≥ β j for all j, we get:
We recognize
. Thus, êD indeed gathers the disorders which are somewhat possible, i.e., which are not more or less certainly ruled out by the positive or negative observations.
V.3. Abductive Explanations
In propositional logic, a so-called abductive explanation of a conjunction M of literals (representing the observations) with respect to a theory T , is usually defined as a conjunction [27] ) labels (which are weakly consistent, sound, complete and minimal) can be computed for a proposition m; such a label is made of a collection of weighted sets of assumptions. See Benferhat et al. [28] for applications to diagnosis problems.
If we take into account negative information (21) we find (11) again: µ ê D **(d i ) = min(min j (β j → α ij ), min j (ρ j → λ ij ))), which estimates to what extent d i alone explains all the more or less certainly present and all the more or less certainly absent manifestations, using the same line of reasoning as in the previous limited information case.
This brief discussion points out the agreement between the relational approach (in the single fault incomplete information case with graded uncertainty) and the possibilistic logic approach. We use this comparison as a basis of a further extension of the FMECA model in the next section. At the computational level, the logical model-based approach relies on techniques that look for prime implicates or prime implicants (see Reiter [29] , Reiter and De Kleer [30] , Jackson [31] , [32] ). These methods extend to possibilistic logic (e.g., Jackson [33] ).
VI. Further Extension of the FMECA: Exploiting an Indirect
Relation Between Disorders and Manifestations
VI.1. A Finer Faulty Behavior Model
Let us now consider a new extension of the FMECA, in which we allow the representation of indirect links between disorders and manifestations. In addition to disorders and manifestations, we consider intermediate entities called events. Let E be the set of all the events used in the definition of the FMECA. Disorders can cause events and/or manifestations, events themselves causing other events and/or manifestations. Events are not directly observable. A single FMECA is now defined as a directed acyclic graph with a disorder (fault mode) at its root, and manifestations at the leaves.
A FMECA can therefore be defined by a theory T consisting of a collection of clauses of the form ¬d i ∨ m j , ¬d k ∨ e l , ¬e m ∨ e n , ¬e p ∨ m q , and, to express negative information: ¬d i' ∨ ¬m j' , ¬d k' ∨ ¬e l' , ¬e m' ∨ ¬e n' , ¬e p' ∨ ¬m q' .
All these one-condition clauses are weighted by a lower bound of a necessity degree (equal to 1 if the implication is certain). As previously, the (positive and negative) observations m or ¬m can also be weighted by a lower bound of a necessity degree. 
VI.2. Deriving the Direct Relation
VI.3. Rationale for the Use of a Synthetic Relation at the Core of the Diagnostic Reasoning
The compilation of the direct relation between disorders and manifestations can be done either once for all during the knowledge acquisition process, i.e., when the application is developed, or at runtime, for each diagnostic session, for instance to take into account the configuration of the satellite, etc. The limited size of the Knowledge Islands exploited by DIAMS keeps this compilation simple. It is equivalent to a shortest path search problem, thus in O(n 3 ) with respect to the number of nodes (disorders, events, manifestations). The off-line compilation of the relation allows the respect of real time constraints for the diagnostic system, as the response time when a symptom is added is almost constant, and can be easily computed.
Dynamic compilation, involving possibilistic inference if event chronologies are considered, is often necessary, since many causal links, or their strength, depend on dynamic aspects of the satellite such as its configuration. Even in this case, compilation is more appropriate than possibilistic inference on the full model:
• the compiled relation provides useful diagnostic focusing tools, such as those described in IV.3.3;
• it is usually computationally cheaper to do the compilation than to repeat the inference process for each new symptom input;
• furthermore, the compilation scope is carefully limited, as it is performed on a single KI, destined to be fully explored.
One could argue that the compilation will reduce the explanations capabilities of the system. This is not the case in DIAMS-III, as virtually all the events expressed in the extended FMECA are directly observable (i.e., their presence is equivalent to the presence of the associated manifestation), and can therefore be included in the generated explanations.
VII. Example: Diagnosis in a Satellite Power Sub-System
This example was chosen because it is realistic without being too complex to be tackled in the context of a paper; it allows the illustration of the modeling approach proposed and of the main diagnostic techniques introduced. The goal is to discriminate among three fault hypotheses which have somewhat similar effects.
VII.1. Overview of the Power Bus Regulation
The goal of the power regulation sub-system (PSS) is to meet the power requirements of the equipments connected on the bus. A ladder of comparators connects as many solar arrays (SA) as necessary ( Figure 11 ). When the voltage is too high on the bus, SA are progressively disconnected. If, due to an anomaly, this is not enough ("All SA disconnected" and still overvoltage), a protection resistor is connected ("OV resistor connection") to create an extra load. It is located in an area of the satellite called KU-ASR; its connection causes a local temperature increase ("KU-ASR temp. increase"), which is dissipated by heat pipes ("KU pipes temp. increase"). If the temperature goes too high, a protection program is triggered ("OV-AP activation"), and the KU payload may be swiched off ("KU payload shedding"). The failure of the transistor controling the overvoltage resistor may cause its undue connection. The system then connects additional SA to cope with the extra load on the bus ("1 or 2 extra SA connected"). If the bus was heavily loaded, the connection of all SA may not be sufficient to meet the power requirements. In this case, batteries are connected, and an unlatching procedure is triggered by the battery management software ("Bat. Man. unlatching"), to progressively swich off non vital equipments. This may result in swiching off the payload ("Payload Shedding").
A failure of the KU heat dissipation systems will also cause a temperature increase of the KU heat pipes, and probably of the KU-ASR area.
VII.2. Extended FMECA, Causal KI Definition
Three fault modes are defined: "KU heat dissipation systems failure", "OV resistor command failure", and "Bus overvoltage". ("Bus overvoltage" is considered as a fault mode for the example; it should actually be an intemediate entity). Although their effects actually depend on the satellite configuration, we will make the simplifying assumption that the power bus load is fairly high. To simplify the example, we assume that all the events are directly observable (i.e., each of them is associated non-ambiguously to one manifestation), and we give the same name to this manifestation (i.e., we equate the events and their associated manifestations).
To be accepted, the number of distinct uncertainty levels should remain small, and preferably be presented in linguistic terms. For a given fault mode, sorting the effects into 6 + 1 categories is a maximum: three levels of more or less certain effects ("completely certain", "almost certain", "likely"), three levels of more or less impossible effects ("completely impossible", "almost impossible", "unlikely"), plus one for ignorance.
The following method is proposed for the construction of the extended FMECA, to ensure the continuity with the existing practice. The experts start by expressing the various fault modes, along with their (more or less) certain effects. When a new FMECA is entered into the system, its discriminability with the existing ones is checked (as described at the end of IV.2.2). If it is not sufficient, the experts are asked if some of the (more or less) certain effects of one could not be expressed as more or less impossible for some other fault modes. The three categories of more or less impossible effects are thus filled whenever necessary, to allow a better discrimination. After this refinement stage, if a set of fault modes still cannot be discriminated in a satisfying way, the observability of the fault should be questioned. For instance, in the example, after the certain effects are given, the discriminability of the OV resistor command failure and of the Bus Overvoltage is: Discrimin({d 2 ,d 3 }) = 0.0, and the discriminability of the KU heat dissipation systems failure and the OV resistor command failure is: Discrimin({d 1 ,d 2 }) = 0.5. In a second phase, some simple impossible effects are added to the FMECAs, and the three fault modes are fully discriminable: Discrimin({d 1 ,d 2 ,d 3 }) = 1. This first set of methodological guidelines are being experimented in real life knowledge acquisition activities to get user/expert feedback.
The extended FMECA related to the three above defined fault modes are described in Figure 12 , and their compiled form is given in Table 1 . The tranformation to the direct form is done as described in VI.2. Table 2 gives the qualitative-numeric mapping used for a more compact representation. Table 3 gives a different view of the knowledge expressed in 
VII.3. Diagnostic Scenario
Let us assume that at one point of the diagnostic process, we suspect that the abnormal behavior may be caused by one of the faults previously defined, for instance because a payload shedding occurred. Symptoms are iteratively input to refine the diagnosis. The relevant part of the session is summarized in Table 4 . Initially, all three disorders are possible, and partially relevant: "Palyoad shedding", observed present (certain) is only a likely effect of each of them; they are therefore only partial covers.
We can see that d 3 (Bus Overvoltage) is ruled out at step 2, because it is inconsistent with the observation that not all solar arrays are disconnected. At the same time, d 2 (OV resistor command failure) becomes completely relevant because one of its certain effects (1 or 2 extra SA connected) is confirmed. At steps 3 and 4, d 1 is progressively ruled out because of its inconsistency with the observation that the "OV resistor connection" is juged likely, and then almost certain. This leads to prefer d 2 (OV resistor command failure). At step 4, no test has a discrimination power greater than 0. The diagnostic process could however be carried on to make sure that the other expected manifestations are indeed present.
VIII. Conclusion
Refinements of the FMECA based on possibility theory have been proposed for a greater expressivity. Consistency-based and abductive diagnosis algorithms using uncertain observations have been introduced. They provide richer results than the current operational system. Additonal tools such as measures of the discriminability of a set of fault modes, of the utility of a test, address operational requirements. The approach was compared with the logical approach to diagnosis, and on this basis, a new extension of the FMECA has been proposed to handle sequences of events consecutive to a fault. This work forms a part of a more comprehensive study of the handling of uncertainty, time and incompleteness in a real world diagnostic application. This project is fully reported in the first author dissertation (Cayrac [34] ). Undergoing experiments should prove that these techniques are mature enough to be used in real world knowledge based systems. It would also be particularly interesting to exploit temporal aspects in the chronologies of events, and to extend the model proposed for handling the functional Knowledge Islands which types of problem. See Cayrac [34] for preliminary results on temporal aspects; an operational method for model-based reasoning about Knowledge Islands is described in [35] .
